ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The predicted massive penetration of Distributed Generation (DG) within existing power distribution systems will lead to an ineluctable changing towards active networks. Whether current forecasts about the growth of the penetration of DG are correct, with higher amounts of generation available and dispatchable, the possibility of intentional islanding becomes realistic even though it necessitates of a complete review of the safety procedures and a larger adoption of automation, protection and communication systems [1] [2] [3] . The islanding operation concerns the use of DG to support the system during a sustained interruption, due to a failure in the network, to restore a part of the load until the fault is cleared. This practice requires the ability to subdivide the distribution network into portions electrically isolated from the remainder of the power system and locally managed by a power controller. In order to transform this theoretical possibility in a ordinary procedure, automation and fast protection devices are necessary to detect the faulty portion of the network, to disconnect it rapidly and to automatically reconfigure the network. Nowadays the intentional islanding is not a common practice in the majority of the developed countries and in some cases is explicitly not allowed by standards [4] . Technical reasons as far as regulatory and safety concerns are the most important barriers to the implementation of the intentional islanding. Anyway, the widespread DG integration and the requirements on service continuity are making the intentional islanding an important planning alternative to improve the quality of service. For this reason, some US distribution companies have started to offer their customers contracts based on the use of intentional islanding, which is not forbidden by IEEE standard [5] [6] . In previous works the authors have investigated the potential benefits of the intentional islanding by means of a methodology for the optimal allocation of Automatic Sectionalizing Switching Devices (ASSDs) [3, 9] . In the paper, a technique for the evaluation of the distribution system reliability based on a Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) method is proposed. The reliability of the network components including lines (trunk, lateral and emergency lines), ASSD, and alternative DG sources (back-up and/or online) is taken into consideration. The examples of application provided help to illustrate the SMC technique and allow comparing the debated practice of the intentional islanding with the more traditional use of emergency connections.
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT METHOD
Several papers in the literature have dealt with the reliability assessment of electric power systems. Analytical and simulation techniques have been developed [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . By considering that the results with simulation and analytical approaches are in very good agreement [11] , in order to overcome the difficulties arising from the rigorous application of analytical procedures, in this work the authors developed an original SMC method. The procedure, based on numerical simulations and implemented with commercial software and FORTRAN language, has been used to simulate the history of the network components and in particular: trunk, lateral and emergency feeders, ASSDs, and DG generators. Due to the flexibility of the methodology, adding the reliability models of HV/MV and MV/LV transformers as well as of other components is straightforward. In assessing the reliability of distribution networks, different independent elements have been considered: the topology of the network, the existence and the availability of ASSD, the availability of alternative energy routes, and the availability of alternative energy sources considering back-up and on-line DG. The procedure is applicable to a network whereas a number of ASSD are positioned in optimal location [10] and a defined penetration level of DG is supposed to be installed. The procedure of reliability evaluation is decomposed into three levels and considers an hourly time varying load and generation. At the first level of simulation the topology of the network is investigated by means a first MC simulation, which determines the time t* when a fault occurs in a certain position in the network. The second level of the simulation considers a reconfiguration of the network during the fault location. In this phase ASSDs may rapidly isolate the faulty
zone and allow many loads to be fed by controlling emergencies ties. The failure of an ASSD can vanish these benefits by increasing both the number of affected nodes and the duration of the interruption. For this reason, this SMC considers the likelihood of ASSDs malfunctions for a more realistic simulation. Finally, the existing DG is considered and its capability to feed the loads isolated due to line faults. All intentional islands have to comply with the technical constraints (e.g. voltage variations, frequency fluctuations, overcurrent and short circuit level, etc.). The power production and the load demand are all calculated at the time t*, by using the hourly load and generation curve of each node [13] . The application of the procedure described in Fig. 1 allows collecting the average number of interruptions and their durations in each MV node. The expected SAIDI and SAIFI can also be assessed to describe the system performance.
CASE STUDY
Network architecture. The developed algorithm has been used to simulate the reliability performance of some existing portions of the Italian distribution system. These networks are normally characterised by a spurious open-loop architecture (Fig. 2) , with customers organized in two reliability categories: top priority customers (trunk nodes) supplied through the main feeder (with open-loop topology), and less important customers (lateral nodes) connected through pure radial schemes. The open-loop scheme allows feeding all trunk nodes in case of line or primary substation faults, by using emergency ties (normally sectionalised in order to preserve the radial operation). The lateral nodes normally suffer for a larger number of long interruptions, due to the typical absence of lateral emergency ties. Indeed, in pure radial schemes the service restoration for all the nodes downstream a faulty line requires the fault to be repaired.
Effect of network automation, emergency ties and intentional islanding on network reliability.
In order to reduce the number and the duration of interruptions, suffered by customers supplied by both lateral and trunk branches, ASSDs may be advantageously used [7, 8] . In fact, network automation allows a prompt detection of the fault location, and a quick restoration of the service to the unfaulted part of the network. Of course, these benefits depend on the number of ASSDs used. The simultaneous presence of emergency ties permits reestablishing the service to a larger portion of the network, exalting the reduction of the reliability indexes if they are well coordinated with the ASSDs. It should be noticed that the presence of emergency ties without network automation allow reducing only the duration of interruptions, because they are unable to influence the fault location stage. Intentional islanding may represent an alternative to the emergency ties for the improvement of some lateral nodes reliability. In fact, in presence of a fault, the generators have the possibility to sustain the service in a portion of the network downstream the faulted line, after that portion has been disconnected from the rest of the network. If the disconnection is performed automatically by using ASSDs and the generators can stay on-line during the fault, intentional islanding reduces number and duration of interruptions for the nodes in the island. On the other hand, if the network separation is carried out manually or the generators can offer only a back-up service, intentional islanding affects only the duration of interruptions of those nodes, because it cannot be activated during the fault location stage. From these considerations, it appears evident that intentional islanding has a local effect on the network reliability and does not change drastically the reliability indexes of the whole distribution network.
To better explain the role of ASSDs, DG and emergency connection during line faults, a small portion of the test network, circled in Fig. 2 and magnified in Fig. 3 been proved to be really effective to show the potential benefits of the intentional islanding practice in different operating conditions. ASSDs have been placed in nodes A 1 , A 2 , and A 3 . Two other ASSDs control the emergency tie (dashed line in Fig. 3 ) at nodes E 1 and E 2 . Such emergency connection does not exist in the actual network, but it has been considered as a planning alternative to be compared with intentional islanding for improving the network reliability. DG 1 and DG 2 are two generators connected to the network that, depending on their power capacity, can be used to supply islanded portions of the network. Of course, more ASSDs and generators are deployed in the rest of network, as showed in Fig. 2 . All the reported system reliability indexes (i.e. SAIDI and SAIFI) refer to the whole network but, in order to emphasize the local role of intentional islanding, two critical lateral nodes, N 1 and N 2 , have been carefully examined.
The effect of faults without the emergency connection E 1 -E 2 and with on-line DG can be described as follows. In case of a line fault between A 2 and A 3 , the nodes upstream the faulty area remain in service. The nodes downstream A 3 may be supplied during the location stage provided that DG 1 has sufficient power capacity to pick up the loads in the isolated area. The nodes within the two ASSDs cannot be supplied during the location stage. During the fault repair stage, a wider intentional island may be formed depending on the balance between generation and loads (Fig. 4) . By so doing, DG reduces the number of interruptions to those nodes, which can be supplied during the location phase. The potential role of DG during the repair stage is a drastic reduction of the duration of the interruptions. Finally, also private back-up generators can be used to sustain isolated nodes supplied by a healthy portion disconnected due to faults. In this case the back-up DG can give its contribution only during the repair stage. In fact, back-up generators generally have a start-up time so long that all nodes have an interruption (longer than 3 minutes) during the fault location phase. If intentional islanding is forbidden, all the nodes downstream the faulty line remain isolated during the repair stage. In this case, the only improvement of the network reliability is provided by the ASSDs that reduce the extension of the faulty area and permit to detect and locate the fault more rapidly. Fig. 3 . The magnification of the circled portion in Fig. 2 Test system. In the paper, the proposed methodology has been applied to the portion of Italian 20kV distribution network depicted in Fig.2 . It presents a single open-loop feeder between 2 HV/MV substations with one branch sectionalised (emergency tie), that guarantees the radial operation, and different laterals with radial schemes. This network supplies 142 MV/LV nodes, divided in 25 trunk nodes and 117 lateral nodes. Overhead distribution lines and cable feeders are used, for a total length of 69.5 km of power lines. The average amount of electric power delivered to MV nodes is 9.1 MW. In order to assess the network reliability indexes, a fault rate of 0.15 failures/year·km and 0.10 failures/year·km have been assumed for overhead lines and buried cables respectively. The fault location time has been assumed conventionally equal to an average value of 1 hour in case of a manually operated network and of 10 minutes for a fully automated network. The repair stage mainly depends on the kind of the faulted line. Overhead lines are less reliable than buried cables but they can be repaired easier; in the paper the average fault repair time is equal to 8 hours and 5 hours for buried cables and overhead lines respectively [7] . Finally, in order to assess the effect of intentional islanding on network reliability, generators of different power capacity have been connected in suitable nodes. Indeed, both the DG penetration level and the nominal power capacity of generators influence the number of nodes, which can be picked up with the intentional islanding during the location/repair phase of the fault. Load and generation curves
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also play an important role to determine whether an intentional island may be formed or not. In the paper the daily load curve of each load point has been discretized into 24 intervals and a probabilistic approach is adopted by assuming for each interval a normal distribution of probability. The same approach has been adopted for the generators, but the probability density function depends on the primary energy source used. Five test cases have been analysed assuming the probability of failure for the ASSDs to be 0.03%. In case A, nor DG neither emergency ties are included in the analysis. In case B the automated reclosing of the emergency path between the nodes E 1 and E 2 is considered. The probability of failure of the automatic switches is assumed to be 0.06%. In case C, the emergency connection E 1 -E 2 is manually operated. The failure rate of the emergency path is taken into account in both cases B and C. In case D the generators DG 1 and DG 2 are operated in parallel to the distribution system to provide continuously power for the needs of the network. Finally, in case E the generators act as a back-up to the loads that can be picked up within an intentional island, which can be created by reconfiguring the network by means of the ASSDs or sectionalising the node immediately downstream the faulty line. The generators are considered to be 96% reliable in case D and 94.8% in case of back-up operation.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The sequential Monte Carlo method described in Fig. 1 has been applied to the case study in Fig. 2 . In order to guarantee its convergence the system has been simulated for 50,000 years. Initially, the SMC has been used to case A whereas ASSDs are used only to limit the extension of the faulty area (normally it should be avoided that trunk nodes could be influenced by faults located in lateral branches). In this situation the network shows the worst reliability indexes. SAIDI is equal to 83.4 min/year and SAIFI is 0.72 interruptions/year. Despite these satisfactory average results, lateral nodes N 1 and N 2 still have too many interruptions and, precisely, 1.34 interruptions/year and 1.57 interruptions/year respectively, lasting for up to several hours/year (Table I ) . Even in this small example the critical situation of lateral nodes is clearly evident as well as the importance of alternative energy paths or sources to supply lateral nodes. The adoption of the emergency tie in Fig. 3 helps to locally improve the reliability. In particular, if the emergency connection is automatically operated the number and the duration of long interruptions in nodes N 1 and N 2 reduce drastically. The duration of the interruptions in N 2 is reduced by 70.7% and the number of interruptions is reduced by 63.1% (Table I , column 2). The reduction of the SAIDI and the SAIFI in this case is less important (27.5% and 8.3% respectively) because the emergency tie aims at resolving reliability problems in lateral nodes. The manual operation of the same emergency connection leads to similar results, the reliability in N 1 and N 2 may be drastically improved but such improvement is lower than with the fully automated emergency tie. It is worth to observe that the number of interruptions for the test nodes (Table I) does not change with a manually operated emergency tie, whereas the reliability requirement imposed by regulators at the MV level is a limit on the number of interruptions. For example, in Italy the Authority for Electricity and Gas (AEEG) has recently imposed a limit of 3, 4 or 5 interruptions/year for the MV customers in high, medium and low load density respectively [8] . Thus, manually operated emergency connections are really useful to comply with LV customers reliability requirements that are normally based on the duration of interruptions, but they are not useful to improve MV customers reliability. The use of the intentional islanding may also help to improve the reliability. Generators DG 1 and DG 2 are able to supply some of the loads in the lateral examined. Firstly it has been assumed that generators were connected to the network and that they can remain in service during the fault clearing procedure (i.e. DG with induction generators or with PWM interfaced generators [15] ). As it can be observed in Table I , intentional islanding from on-line DG leads to a really drastic reduction of all reliability indexes but, due to the lower reliability of DG and to the need of forming only selfsustained islands, such reduction is lower than with emergency ties. It is really important to observe the number of interruptions/year is similar for both the compared solutions. With back-up DG, generators are used to supply the faulty network after the fault has been located and the faulty line has been sectionalised. This way of using the intentional islanding is much more simple to be implemented in the system and the distributor can simply rent the back-up generator from customers in the event of faults. This solution can be considered equivalent to the use of manually operated emergency connections (Table I ) and this practice does not allow reducing the number of interruptions for the MV nodes. A further analysis has been carried out for evaluating the distribution of the duration of the interruptions at node N 2 .
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The duration of the interruptions has been classified into 5 intervals as showed in Fig. 5 . It can be noticed that intentional islanding and emergency connection increase the number of interruptions, which last for less the half an hour. This effect is very important with reference to the reliability requirements for LV customers. Finally, some parametric studies have been carried out to clarify the impact of DG penetration. The first study aims at showing the impact of the DG penetration level on the efficiency of intentional islanding. It has been found that the first significant contribution to the improvement of the network reliability can be achieved with a penetration level (the ratio between the DG power and the load) greater than 30%. The intentional islanding can give the same performances of fully automated emergency connections only if very high penetration levels are reached (greater than 40%). The impact of the reliability and availability of lines and generators is not particularly important whether these parameters vary within reasonable ranges.
CONCLUSIONS
Many industrialised countries have imposed to distributors severe standards on reliability indexes. Some countries have adopted regulatory actions based on incentives and penalties to promote the reliability improvement. In Italy, the regulator imposed distributors to reduce the number of interruptions not due to acts of God or caused by third parties. Initially the attention was posed on the LV customers, now the attention is moving to the MV ones. For this reason, distributors need tools for assessing different actions to improve the reliability. In the paper an SMC has been developed to compare different actions that can be applied to distribution networks. This study clearly shows that intentional islanding increases its importance as DG penetration increases. In case of on-line DG, intentional islanding may permit complying with the reliability requirements on both LV and MV customers. Backup generators can give an important help to reduce the duration of interruptions that is the most common reliability requirement to be complied with for LV customers. In conclusion it is really important to notice that similar or better reliability improvements can be obtained with the emergency ties coordinated with efficient ASSDs. In this case the main problem may be constituted by the need of building new MV lines because of the level of investments required and the unwillingness of public opinion to have new power lines in its area. As general remark, both intentional islanding and emergency ties can drastically reduce the number of interruptions only if the network can be automatically reconfigured with ASSDs. Otherwise, both practices can help to reduce the duration of interruptions suffered by the customers but they are ineffective to reduce the number of interruptions. In both cases, distributors should change the approach that refuses the intentional islanding for safety reasons and also refuses the fully automated network reconfiguration for the same motivations. In the future due to the widespread integration of DG and to more stringent regulatory actions both actions should be adopted to avoid paying penalties or to satisfy the customer demand of better continuity of service. 
